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布莱恩•H•比克斯/著:拉兹论必然性(1)  

添加时间:2006-06-07 16:14    浏览次数: 4912 次

布莱恩·H·比克斯/著,于庆生/译:拉兹论必然性(1-10


发表时间:2006-4-9 17:43:00  阅读次数:50



 


以下㈠来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=52413





导论





约瑟夫·拉兹是当代英文分析法哲学中最重要的理论家。[1]他的著作对法律哲学的许多领域都贡献了意义重大并富有争议的新观念,包括对最为古老和最为费解的问题——“什么是法律(的性质)?”——的研究。拉兹关于法律性质的讨论,不仅包括对法律而言什么是“必然的”和“本质的”的思考[2],也提出了奠基于这一思考之上的其他结论。这些思考“必然性”的见解提出了基本的问题,即关注法律哲学中被提出的,并且能被提出的主张的类型。另一个间接提出的论题是,在我们是否应该或不应该根据法哲学中的“必然性”进行表述这个问题中,什么是有风险的。





Joseph Raz is the foremost theorist in contemporary English-language analytical jurisprudence.1 His work has contributed significant and provocative new ideas in many areas of legal philosophy, including that most ancient, and most obscure, inquiry – “what is (the nature of) law?” Raz’s discussions of the nature of law have included claims regarding what is ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’ for law,2 as well as offering other conclusions that are grounded on assertions regarding this nature. These sort of comments regarding ‘necessity’ raise basic questions regarding the type of claims that are being offered, and that can be offered, within legal philosophy. The other issue raised, indirectly, is what is at stake in the question of whether we should or should not speak in terms of ‘necessity’ in jurisprudence.





在这篇文章中,我将要探究法哲学——特别是法律性质的理论,和约瑟夫·拉兹的著作——中关于“必然性”的论述。近年来,拉兹已经成为揭示法哲学中元理论问题的少数理论家之一。本文将对这些著作给出一个批判性的概述,并对争论如何发展以及其意义之所在提供一个指南。将要得出的一个结论是,法哲学中“必然性”论说的可能性是与概念分析的可能性齐头并进的;如果某人在论述法律过程中得出一个是不可能的或者是不恰当的,那么另一个也是一样。如我将要表明的,法哲学中概念分析的辩护者很可能遵循拉兹的指引,提出一个明显不同于柏拉图主义者,但颇为深刻地奠基于社会的生活方式或其自我理解(self-understanding)的“必然性”概念。在这个意义上,人们可能得出一个似是而非的观点,“超越时间变化的必然真理”(“necessary truths that change over time”)。不过,在明确表述和证明这一结论——存在(或“我们拥有”)唯一一个法律概念——的过程中,我们还有很多工作要做。





In this paper, I will investigate discussions of ‘necessity’ in jurisprudence, with particular emphasis on theories of the nature of law, and on the work of Joseph Raz. In recent years, Raz has been one of the few theorists to explore the important meta-theoretical questions



in jurisprudence. This essay will give a critical overview of these works, offering a guide to how the debate has developed and what its significance is. One conclusion that will be reached is that thepossibility of ‘necessity’ talk in jurisprudence goes hand-in-hand with the possibility of conceptual analysis; if one concludes that one is impossible or inappropriate in discussing law, then likely the other is as well. As will be discussed, a defense of conceptual analysis in jurisprudence must likely follow Raz’s lead, offering a notion of ‘necessity’ that is distinctly not Platonist, but is rather deeply grounded in a community’s way of life or its self-understanding. In this sense, one can have the paradoxically sounding “necessary truths that change over time”. At the same time, there is still much work to be done in articulating and justifying a conclusion that there is (or “we have”) only one concept of law.





  这一研究将分阶段进行,以一种更为根本的对哲学中的“必然性”的考量开始,然后直面这一具体问题,即这一主张是否能或是否应该被置于关于法律性质的理论之中。第一部分将讨论哲学中的“必然性”主张。第二部分将介绍概念分析,对它在法哲学中的使用进行概述,并思考对这一进路的一个最近的批判。第三部分将考察对法哲学中概念分析的一种批判的不同路线——不存在单一的法律概念——,并对一个类似的评论如何适用于拉兹的观点进行评价。





The investigation will proceed in stages, beginning with a more general consideration of ‘necessity’ claims in philosophy, and then facing the specific question of whether such claims can and should be made within theories about the nature of law. Part I discusses ‘necessity’ claims in philosophy. Part II introduces conceptual analysis, offers an overview of its use in jurisprudence, and considers one recent critique of that approach. Part III considers a different line of criticism of conceptual analysis in jurisprudence – that there is no single concept of law – and also evaluates how a similar critique might apply to Raz’s view.







1]他的著作对于当前法律、道德和政治哲学中流行的争论都做出了重要的贡献:拉兹19791980198619901994199920012003



2]在论述概念分析,特别是存在于,或被认为是存在概念和要素特性之间的联系时,我遵循拉兹、哲学家弗兰克·杰克森,以及大多数学者将“必然的”/“必然性”和“本质”/“本质的”大致视为可互换的用法。





以下㈡来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=52655





一、“必然性”的难题





(一)什么是“必然性”?



在他的论文《权威、法律与道德》(“Authority, Law, and Morality”)中,拉兹写道:“我假设必然的法律——每一在任何地方都有效力的法律体系——有着事实上的(de facto)权威性。这必然伴有或者它拥有,或者它被坚持拥有合法的权威性的要求,或者两者都是。”[3]这在拉兹的论证中是个核心观点,虽然它很少被优先论证或具有优先的等级安置。拉兹继续断言:“如果权威性要求是法律性质的组成部分,那么无论法律是什么,它必须有能力拥有权威性。”[4]根据一种关于什么使它被视为具有潜在的权威性的观点,拉兹精心构思了一套所谓“排他的法律实证主义”(“exclusive legal positivism”)的论证:通过法律性质,不必诉诸于道德判断,法律规则就是可识别的。[5





In his essay, “Authority, Law, and Morality”, Raz writes: “I will assume that necessarily law, every legal system which is in force anywhere, has de facto authority. That entails that the law either claims that it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it, or both”.3 This is a central point in Raz’s argument, though it appears with little prior argument or stage-setting. Raz goes on to assert: “If the claim to authority is part of the nature of law, then whatever else the law is it must be capable of possessing authority”.4From a view about what it takes to be potentially authoritative, Raz elaborates an argument for what has become known as “exclusive legal positivism”: that by the nature of law, legal rules must be identifiable without resort to moral judgments.5





在本文中,我的兴趣并不在于评价拉兹之排他的法律实证主义的“从权威性的论证”(argument-from-authority)的长处,这一工作已经被其他许多人做过了[6]。我所关注的毋宁说是拉兹之初始要求的特性或状态。他一直创造着,如他所说,“法律的性质”或者能被归于“法律”范畴下的任何事物的“必然的”要素的主张。为了避免“必然性”的这一用法被认为脱离了拉兹的著作,在他的大量晚近著作中被更为精心构建的同种分析所展现的必须被关注到。[7]还应该注意到,拉兹决不是得出这一主张的第一个法律理论家。约翰·奥斯丁根据某一客体是否拥有“组成这一种类本质的所有特性”,区分了“合宜地所谓法律”和“不合宜地所谓法律”;[8]并写道“努力解决法律……根据必然性和它的本质构成部分。”[9





My interest in this essay is not in evaluating the merits of Raz’s argument-from-authority for exclusive legal positivism, a task many others have already undertaken.6 My concern is rather with the character or status of Raz’s initial claim. He is making a claim about, as he puts it, “the nature of law”, or the ‘necessary’ elements of everything which falls under the category ‘law’. Lest this use of ‘necessity’ be thought to be aberrational within Raz’s work, it should be observed that the same sort of analysis appears, with greater elaboration, in a number of his later works.7 It should also be noted that Raz is by no means the first legal theorist to make claims of this sort. John Austin distinguished between “laws properly so called” and “laws improperly so called” based on whether an object had “all the qualities composing the essence of the class”;8 and wrote of “endeavour[ing] to resolve a law ...into the necessary and essential parts of which it is composed”.9





对于“本质”和“必然性”的参照必须攻击某一对现代而言不太一致的评论。罗纳德·德沃金的评注——在有点不太一样的语境中——“法律本质主义的古怪世界”[10]或许是最好的例证。在一个社会制度的讨论中,这一形而上学术语有什么作用呢?[11





Still, reference to ‘essence’ and ‘necessity’ must strike a slightly discordant note to modern ears. This may be exemplified by Ronald Dworkin’s reference, in a somewhat different context, to “the peculiar world of legal essentialism”.10 What is such metaphysical language doing in a discussion of a social institution?11





3]拉兹(1994p. 199);



4]参见拉兹(1994p. 199)。在拉兹最近著作中,这一要求被重复,经常是更为强调的。参见例如拉兹(1988, p. 3; 1996, p. 6),并且在一本早期著作中,这一要求的形式也可以发现(Raz 1979, pp. 2833)。



5]参见拉兹(1994, pp. 199204);也可参见Waluchow (1994, pp. 123140)[讨论了拉兹的排他性法律实证主义的从权威性的论证]。



6]参见,例如Waluchow (1994);科尔曼(1998b, pp. 267278);雷特(1998, pp. 540544)



7]参见,例如拉兹 (1996, p. 2),“法律之一般理论的命题的普遍性是这一事实的一个结构,即他们要求必然性真理,并且没有什么比他们所要求的更少了”;拉兹(1998, p. 255),“那么什么被算作一个概念的解释呢?它是由对它作为概念的必然特征和本质特征的某些表述所组成的。在这种情况下,它表述了法律的某些必然的和本质的特征”。迪克森(2001, p. 17 n. 24)注意到了拉兹使用“必然性”的论题,但没有进行更深地的分析。



8]奥斯丁(1995, Lecture V, pp. 108109),奥斯丁的《范围》——被视为是法律实证主义的很有创意的著作——最早出版于1832年)。



9]奥斯丁(1995, p. 117)。



10]德沃金(1984, p. 259);参见克拉默(1999, p. 179),“(德沃金的)关于本质主义的两者之一的主张是错误的,或者说对他而言,本质主义的应用与任何实证主义者是一样的。”



11]另一方面,某些法律理论家认为,它是缺乏之法哲学并无法进行的一种思维方式:即便谈论“本质”已经不再流行,在这些(法律实证主义和自然法理论之间的)争论中,类似“本质”观点的这些概念也必须被牢记在心,否则我们便不能将法哲学这一特殊科学与任何法律主题的古老争论区分开(骚泼1995pp. 365366)。





以下㈢来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=53381





(二)一般的“必然性”要求:





在法律讨论中存在“必然性”的位置吗?一些哲学家已经在界定某些术语——当这些术语意指某种其边界是由“世界存在的方式”所叙述的门类时——过程中为“必然性”做了辩护。这些就是“自然种类”的术语——像“水”和“金子”——,并且文献中的争论——至少是最初的——被表明了这一问题,即这种类型的术语是否通过人们关于这一物品的性质或世界存在的方式所确定的证明。[12]无论对于指向自然或物质实体的术语之“自然种类”分析有什么优点,其适用于人类制度和社会实践还是有很大问题的。“金子”是一种其界限由世界来确定下来的范畴,并且其本质是由我们当前所拥有的最先进的科学理论所评价的;然而,认为同样的思路能适用于“棒球”或“法律”,确实没有什么道理的。“世界”以什么样的方式对于何者算作“法律”,何者不算画界?法律的性质拥有一种“科学的理论”意味着什么呢?[13





Is there a place for ‘necessity’ within discussions of law? Some philosophers have argued for ‘necessity’ in the definition of certain terms, when those terms denote some category whose boundaries are arguably set out by “the way the world is”. These are ‘natural kind’ terms, like ‘water’ and ‘gold’, and the debate within the literature, at least initially, was addressed to the question of whether terms of this kind have their reference determined by people’s beliefs about the item’s nature or by the way the world is.12 Whatever the merit of a ‘natural kinds’ analysis for terms that refer to natural or physical entities, its applicability to human institutions and social practices would seem to be much more problematic. ‘Gold’ may be a category whose boundaries are set by the world, and its essence estimated by the best scientific theory we currently have; there is, however, little reason to think that a similar approach would work for ‘baseball’ or for ‘law’. In what way could ‘the world’ be said to delimit what does and does not count as ‘law’?, and what would it mean to have a ‘scientific theory’ of the nature of law?13





哲学文献中另一种分析模式或许是索尔·克里普克(Saul Kripke)的“固定的指称词”(rigid designators)的观念:在反事实的意义上,单一的术语在所有合理世界中有同样的指代。[14]此外,虽然作为恰当名称此一分析具有说服力,但是如果——充其量——适用于类似法律的社会实践或社会制度,它也是有难度的。[15





Another analogy within the philosophical literature might be Saul Kripke’s idea of rigid designators: that in counterfactuals, singular terms are intended to have the same reference in all possible worlds.14 Again, while the analysis is arguably persuasive as regards proper names, it would be awkward, at best, if applied to a social practice or social institution like law.15





在关于法律性质的理论语境中,对在这些讨论中的“必然性”的使用,关于指代和语义的克里普克-普特曼(Kripke-Putnam)理论并不像是有帮助的,除了宽泛地分析。[16]在哲学分析中保留着思考的一条路线。





In the context of theories about the nature of law, and the use of ‘necessity’ within such discussions, the Kripke-Putnam theories about reference and semantics do not seem helpful, except perhaps by broad analogy.16 There remains one path in philosophical analysis to consider.





12]参见普特曼(1975)。对试图将“自然种类”理论适用于法律的努力的批判性分析,参见比克斯(1993, pp. 157173)。



13]米歇尔·摩尔(1998, p. 312)认为,哈特的法律理论可以被视为意味着某些类似的事物——“正如同在自然世界中存在着‘自然种类’一样,因而在社会世界中存在着‘社会种类’,法律也是其中之一”——但是,这仍然留给我们一些一文,即存在的“社会类型”指的是什么。



14]参见克里普克(1972)。



15]在一种更为一般的层次上,某人可能接受克里普克和普特曼的立场,这意味着带有一种社会层面,并且不是个人主义的(在精神上),即使他不接受确定我们的概念的意义的“世界”。拉兹(1998, pp. 262264 & n. 26)。对于目前分析的这一“折中立场”的意义,在本文后面将有更为清楚地分析。



人们还应该注意到尼克斯·斯塔夫罗伯洛斯(Nicos Stavropoulos)的最近著作,它利用并与克里普克-普特曼的语义分析可以比较,奠定了法律解释中的客观性理论。斯塔夫罗伯洛斯(1996)。



16]参见上文注15





以下㈣来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=54277





二、概念分析与法哲学





(一)一般的概念分析





人们很可能援引这一观点来回应争论:“当然,关于法律性质的法哲学争论并不是一种对法律必然性,或者甚至是一种自然种类的分析。它是一种概念分析,无论‘必然的’或‘本质的’要求涉及到什么,这些都是对概念的研究”。[17





One likely response to the discussion up to this point would be: “Of course, a jurisprudential discussion about the nature of law is not an analysis of logical necessity, or even of a natural kind. It is a conceptual analysis, and whatever ‘necessary’ or ‘essential’ claims are involved are those of the inquiry into concepts”.17





自然,概念的哲学分析没有什么新颖之处。例如,关于知识是否应该被界定为“证立的真实信仰”(justified true belief)[18],存在着长期的争议。我们确实相信,我们能明智地分析我们的概念,并且至少在某些时候,我们能确定它们本质的(和非本质的)属性是什么。[19]概念分析对于法哲学而言,确实没有什么新颖之处:在上个世纪以英语出版的最为重要的法哲学文本,其题目表明是一个概念,即哈特的《法律的概念》。[20]





Philosophical analysis of concepts is, of course, nothing new. For example, there was a long-standing debate about whether knowledge should be defined as “justified true belief”.18 We do believe that we can sensibly analyze our concepts, and, at least sometimes, determine what their essential (and accidental) attributes are.19 Also, conceptual analysis is certainly nothing new for jurisprudence either: arguably the most important jurisprudential text published in English in the last century was described by its title as being about a concept,H. L.A.Hart’s The Concept of Law.20





然而,有人可能会问,如果我们能够研究事物本身(实践、制度模式),为什么我们还应该研究概念?[21]这很像是一个经验主义者(或者反理智主义者)对非经验的、过分抽象的哲学家的答复。在此层面上,恰当的答复是,概念分析是一种优先探究——除非我们知道“法律”指的是什么,才能研究法律。[22]某些人或许坚持,法律作为一种社会制度,适宜的研究是通过社会理论进行的。其论证逻辑是,法律是一套社会实践,因此其性质最好是被发现的,而不是静思所得,或者毋宁说是通过实际实践(一种在后文变得更重要的观点)的研究所得。然而,人们是否应该认为,对于法律性质的研究是纯粹经验主义的/社会学的,这一主张很容易受到刚刚提到的论证的攻击:如果一个人不能明确至少是大概优先的关于什么是或者不是“法律”的概念,他怎么能拥有一种“法律的社会学理论”呢?[23





However, one might ask, why should we study the concept if we can study the thing itself (the practice, the type of institution) instead?21 This may seem like an empiricist’s (or an anti-intellectual’s) response to impractical, overly abstract philosophers. At that level, the proper response is that conceptual analysis is a prior inquiry – we cannot study law until we know what we mean by ‘law’.22 Some might persist that the proper study of law – a social institution – is through social theory. Law is a set of social practices, the argument would go, so its nature is best discovered, not by armchair reflections, but by an investigation of the actual practices (a view that will be considered at greater length below). However, should someone suggest that the investigation of the nature of law be purely empirical/sociological, that claim would be vulnerable to the argument just offered: how can one have a ‘sociological theory of law’ if one does not have at least a rough prior notion of what is or is not ‘law’?23





因此,概念分析必须优先于经验工作,是很有意义的。[24]因为焦点不可避免地落在类型之边界上——即什么使得它成为“法律”或者“不是法律”?我们不是回答关于个别制度的经验性问题,如关于在英美法律体系中推论的普通法的历史起源,或者当解释法规时美国法官的解释实践。关于特定制度性实践的问题是由社会学理论研究的,它需要现代建构、观测和统计分析的某种结合。然而,关于法律性质的更为一般的讨论——如果这一讨论确实必要的话——并不是一种类似的经验性研究。[25





There is thus a sense in which conceptual work must be prior to empirical work.24 For the focus is inevitably on the boundaries of the category – here, what makes something ‘law’ or ‘not law’? We are not asking empirical questions about particular institutions: e.g., about the historical origins of common law reasoning in the English legal system, or the interpretive practices of American judges when construing statutes. Questions about specific institutional practices would be social theory inquiries, which would call for some combination of model building, observation, and statistical analysis. However, the more general discussion of the nature of law, if such discussion has any place at all, is not a comparably empirical inquiry.25





有人可能会指出,如果试图将法律性质的理论只奠基于经验的或社会学的基础,而不参考概念分析是错误的,那么将这一理论只奠基于概念分析,而不考虑经验的或社会学的真实性,也是同样错误的。[26]实际上,如果“‘法律’的概念”与和法律体系有联系的无论什么实践都没有关系,那么所谓的这一概念有什么意义或价值呢?拉兹自己的观点是,法律的概念是以人们的理解和自我理解为基础的[27]——反过来,人们假设的自我理解又反映了帮助社会制度构建的社会实践。在下文我们还要深入探讨概念分析和经验真实之间的联系。





One might point out that if it would be mistaken to try to ground a theory of the nature of law solely on empirical or sociological grounds, without reference to conceptual analysis, it would be equally mistaken to ground such a theory solely on conceptual analysis, without reference to empirical and sociological truths.26 Indeed, what sense or value could there be to a purported “concept of ‘law’ ” if that concept had no relation whatsoever to the practices we associate with legal systems? Raz’s own view is that the concept of law is grounded on the perceptions and self-understandings of people27 – self-understandings which, in turn, one presumes, reflect the social practices that help to constitute the social institution. The connection between conceptual analysis and empirical truths will be discussed further, below.





17]当然,当经典哲学家提到本质的与非本质的特征时,他们通常指的是事物的本质的和非本质的特征,而不是概念的。参见,如亚里士多德《形而上学》,Book VII, ch. 4



(Aristotle 1984, pp. 16251627)



概念分析是否必须依据“必然的”或“本质的”这些术语进行——所有的概念是否都有此结构,或者以此方式来分析,或者某些是否能仅仅依据范例B来进行诗歌超出本文术语的问题。某些概念能够以此方式来分析,对我们的目的就是足够的。考虑以此方式是否最好地分析了“法律”,并不需要解决是否所有概念都必须以此方式来分析的问题。



18]盖特尔(1963);



19]参见拉兹(1998, p. 273 n. 38),在此拉兹区别了“一般的法律的特征,也就是被所有法律体系所分享的法律的特征”和“法律的本质特征,即不具备便难以成为法律的特征”。



20]哈特(1994);也可参见拉兹(1980)《法律体系的概念》。



21]当米歇尔·摩尔写道,“为了研究法律现象本身,一般法哲学应该避开……概念分析”时,他表达正是这一观点。参见摩尔(1992, p. 206)。然而,根据其来源——一个其工作是奠基于形而上学的现实主义进路的道德或法律哲学家,这很可能并不是其质疑的主要意图。在很多模式中概念分析所起的作用,就是在摩尔的分析中柏拉图的本质、自然种类或功能种类所起的作用。像摩尔这样的形而上学的现实主义是否能不利用概念分析进行研究,这并不是本文需要讨论的。也可参见摩尔(1998, p. 313),重申了通过概念研究现象与直接研究其本身的区别,但是其结论是,至少对法律而言,“这一区别并不很大”。



22]参见,如杰克森(2000, pp. 3031);科尔曼(2002, pp. 347351),对自然主义者对概念分析的批判提出了类似的回应。



23]一种可能的回应是,在开始其他(经验性)工作之前,法律概念之优先性是必需的,同时,单一的制度和语言的使用方式对这一目的也是充足的。更为浓厚的概念分析是不需要的(或者说,某些注释者可能会添加),雷特(2002)。



24]然而,至少在理论家研究一个既存概念的性质的情况下,进行概念分析的理论必需遵从世界存在的方式也是很有意义的。如果我们假定一个新的概念或范畴,情况就会不同,并且经验性主张的考量会影响概念。参见拉兹(1994, p. 221)。



25]这并不是要主张,社会学研究必须从属于概念分析。我们拥有(例如)什么是,什么不是“法律”的粗疏意义的事实,并不意味着社会理论必须建立在遵从那些概念的类型之上。



26]这一观点得到了布雷恩·塔玛纳哈(Brian Tamanaha)的强有力地支持。参见塔玛纳哈(1997, 2000, 2001, pp. 132)。





以下㈤来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=54423





(二)关于概念分析的怀疑主义态度:自然主义和家族类似性(Family Resemblance





1、自然主义



作为对概念分析简明概观的一个最终点,应该考虑一下某些理论家对于概念和概念分析的整个观念表示的质疑。这种质疑之一是由布莱恩·雷特提出的:



“概念”是什么?一个怀疑者可能会说,“概念”就是当哲学家的工作是意义之分析时,他们用来指称“意义”的。但是,自从奎因(Quine)使得哲学家陷入承认他们不知道“意义”是什么的窘境以后,他们就开始转而分析“概念”了。[28





As one final stop in this brief overview of conceptual analysis, it should be taken into account that some theorists challenge the whole notion of concepts and conceptual analysis. A challenge of this sort is offered (though only partly endorsed) by Brian Leiter:





What is a ‘concept’? A cynic might say that a ‘concept’ is just what philosophers used to call ‘meaning’ back when their job was the analysis of meaning. But ever since Quine embarrassed philosophers into admitting that they didn’t know what ‘meanings’ were, they started analyzing ‘concepts’ instead.28





在某种程度上,这一对概念分析的质疑是与唯名论者(nominalist)的批判相关的,这将在第三部分进行详细地考量。除了对于唯名论者批判的回应以外,人们可能补充道(如雷特所作的),“法律的概念”比“善的概念”具有更多的有点,因为它存在可以作为我们讨论基础的可辨识的实践和制度。[29]法律的概念不能被轻易地指责是一个由形而上学主义者在余暇时间所构建的难以理解的实体。[30





In a way, this challenge to conceptual analysis is related to a nominalist critique, which will be considered in greater length in Part III. In addition to the responses to the nominalist critique that will be considered at that point, one might add (as Leiter himself does), ‘the concept of law’ has an advantage over ‘the concept of the good’, in that there is an identifiable set of practices and institutions to ground our discussions.29 The concept of law cannot easily be accused of being an entirely mysterious entity, made up by metaphysicians in their spare time.30





此外,如朱尔斯·科尔曼(Jules Coleman)所主张的,W. V. O.奎因所批判的分析的真相的探查是与现代法律理论进行概念分析所做的极为不同的。[31]无论是H. L. A.哈特,还是约瑟夫·拉兹或者朱尔斯·科尔曼,或者任何其他杰出的法律理论家,都不能被理解为是试图确定某种超历史、超经验(柏拉图的)的观念(trans-historical trans-empirical (Platonic) Idea)的分析的“本质”。[32





Further, as Jules Coleman has argued, the search for analytic truths that Quine criticized is quite different from whatmodern legal theorists were (and are) doing in their conceptual theories.31 Neither Hart nor Joseph Raz or Jules Coleman, nor any other prominent legal theorist, could reasonably be understood as trying to determine the analytical ‘essence’ of some trans-historical trans-empirical (Platonic) Idea.32





27]参见,拉兹(1996, pp. 56)。



28]雷特(1998, p. 535)。雷特继续道:“我认为,怀疑主义者的观点有一点是真实的,但是它并非是全部的情况”。Id. Cf. Jackson (2000, p. vii),“恰当地理解的话,概念分析并不是奎因所怀疑的难以理解的活动。毋宁说,它是任何人——哲学家和非哲学家都一样——都熟识的某种事物”;也可参见id., pp. 4446, 5255(对奎因的回应)。



29]雷特(1998, p. 536)。



30]对比一下J. L. Mackie的指责,即道德客观主义依赖于一种“难以理解的实体”的信念。Mackie (1977)





 



  以下㈥来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=56940





2、家族类似性:



众所周知,路德维格·维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)引进了一个“家族类似性”的概念,用来概括根据必然的和充足的条件不能理解,但毋宁说是有着多样性和相互重叠标准的概念和范畴(维特根斯坦举出了“语言”、“游戏”和“数字”的例子)。[33]维特根斯坦没有主张所有的概念都是家族相似性概念,只有某些概念是,因此假设对每个概念来说总是有必然的和充足的条件是错误的。[34





Ludwig Wittgenstein famously introduced the notion of ‘family resemblance’ as a shorthand for the way that some concepts and categories (Wittgenstein used the examples ‘language’, ‘game’, and ‘number’) cannot be understood in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather have a variety of different and overlapping criteria.33 Wittgenstein was not claiming that all concepts were family resemblance concepts, only that some were, and therefore it would be a mistake to assume that there would always be necessary and sufficient conditions for every concept.34





一些作者已经指出,“法律”就是这样一个没有一般特征——因而没有“必然的”特征的家族相似性概念。[35]哈特自己也指出,“家族相似性”概念或许是特别契合于法律术语的,[36]并且在《法律的概念》的前面他就做了宽泛地暗示,“法律”最好以这种方式理解,[37]虽然在同一本书的后面他好像为这些概念提供了一套必然的和充足的条件。[38





A number of writers have suggested that ‘law’ might be such a family resemblance concept, with instantiations having no feature in common – and thus no ‘necessary’ features.35 Hart himself suggested that the notion of ‘family resemblance’ might be particularly relevant to legal terms,36 and he broadly hinted early in The Concept of Law that ‘law’ might well best be understood in this way,37 though later in the same book he offered what appeared to be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for that term.38





必须注意的是,因为没有人主张所有的概念都是家族相似性概念,即便是某人承认有一些是,分析和辩论必须通过概念到概念(concept by concept)来得到发展。“反证”“法律”是一个家族相似性概念的一种方式是,证明根据必然的和充足的条件的分析是错误的,就像拉兹和其他人已经做出的那样。如果这一分析是正确的,就足以表明“法律”不是一个家族相似性概念。[39





That noted, because no one claims that all concepts are family-resemblance concepts, even if one accepts that some are, analysis and debate must be developed concept by concept. One way to ‘disprove’ that ‘law’ is a family resemblance concept is to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as Raz and others have attempted to do. If the analysis succeeds, that suffices to show that ‘law’ is not a family resemblance concept.39





3、和实践的联系与概念的数目:





在讨论自然主义之挑战时,我注意到,对于自然主义者的攻击,法律概念的理论比其他概念分析是更为脆弱的,因为法律的概念奠基于现实的实践。然而,主张概念分析以某种方式与生活体验(lived experience)相联系,便合理地引出这一——极其困难的——问题:这一联系是什么样的。[40]拉兹写道:





In discussing the challenge of naturalism, I noted that theories about the concept of law might be less vulnerable than other conceptual analyses to naturalist attacks, because the concept of law is grounded in actual practices. However, to say that conceptual analysis is connected with lived experience in some ways leads reasonably to the question – a surprisingly difficult one – of what that connection is.40 Raz suggests the following:





法律的概念是个历史的产物,随时间而变化,并且我们所拥有的概念是比它过去选择的制度更为新近的。……但是,法律的概念并不是法律理论的产物。它是在法律实践的影响下,以及其他文化——包括某一时代法律理论——的影响下,历史地演化的。[41





The concept of law is a historical product, changing over the years, and the concept as we have it is more recent than the institution it is used to single out. ……But the concept of law is not a product of the theory of law. It is a concept that evolved historically, under the influences of legal practice, and other cultural influences, including the influence of the legal theory of the day.41





换言之,今天的法律概念是不同于过去某一时代或世纪的法律概念的。这又引出了法律概念的量化(长期多于一个?在某一个时期多于一个?),以及他们的地方性的或普遍的性质的问题。





In other words, today’s concept of law is different from the concept of law of some generations or centuries in the past. This in turn raises the question of the quantity of concepts of law (more than one over time?, more than one at any given time?), and their parochial or universal nature.





当我们分析“法律”这个概念时,我们用于描述中的修饰语或许是至关重要的。就像哈特的著作标题《法律的概念》一样,我们的描述是否暗示着只存在(并一直如此)一个概念呢?或者我们仅仅提出了“法律的一个概念”,暗示着这是众多概念中唯一可能的一个。[42]即便它仅是众多概念中唯一可能的一个(因此,是在“偶然的”意义上,而不是“必然的”),焦点是否在于非武断地考察这一概念——也就是说,是否存在某些好的理由,以解释我们为什么应该依赖这个概念,而不是另一概念?例如,某人能够主张我们将焦点定在不同可能概念中的一个特定概念上,是因为它是“我们的法律的概念”——虽然在存在其他法律的概念的意义上它是“偶然的”,但是它是与我们社会的语言学实践或一般的自我理解相适合的一个概念?





When we are analyzing the concept ‘law’, the modifier we place in the description can be crucial. Are we describing, as in the title to H. L. A. Hart’s book, The Concept of Law, implying that there is (and has always been) only one? Or are we merely offering “a concept of law”, implying that this is merely one possible concept among many.42 Also, even if it is only one possible concept among many (and thus, in a sense, ‘contingent’, not ‘necessary’), is the focus on this concept non-arbitrary – that is, is there some good reason why we should look to this concept rather than another? For example, might one argue that we are focusing on a particular concept among different possible concepts because it is “our concept of law” – though contingent, in the sense that there are other concepts of law, this is the one that matches our community’s linguistic practices or general self-understanding?







33]维特根斯坦(1958, §§ 6568)。一个批判性的讨论,带有更多的引文,参见哥劳克(Glock)(1996, pp. 120124)。



34]参见哥劳克(1996, pp. 123124)。



35]参见伯顿Burton (1985, pp. 19791980);里昂斯Lyons (1983, p. 259)



36]哈特(1994, pp. 279280)。



37]哈特(1994, pp. 1516)。



38]哈特(1994, p. 81)。



39]当然,虽然对立面并非事实所在:一个特定的必然且充足条件的分析的错误并不能证明“法律”是一个家族相似性概念,虽然它有助于促进这一方向上的怀疑态度。



40]我在比克斯(2000)中讨论了这一观点。



41]拉兹(1998, pp. 280, 281)。



42]某人曾经认为这两本书,《法律的概念》(哈特1994)和《正义论》(A Theory of Justice,罗尔斯1999)或许有着交换的冠词。





 



  以下㈦来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=58788 





  在最近的文章中,朱尔斯·科尔曼倡导根据“我们的法律概念”进行思维,并将这一立场与某种必然性的限缩概念联系在一起:





Jules Coleman, in a recent article, has advocated thinking in terms of “our concept of law”, tying that position to a somewhat deflationary notion of necessity:





法哲学的所描述的方案是识别出我们的法律概念的本质或必然特征。任何严肃的分析哲学家都不会相信,法律的流行概念在某种意义上是必然的:其他概念也不是逻辑的或者可能的。我们不相信我们的法律概念从不会遭受修正。事实恰恰相反。在未来的时期,技术或许要求我们以多种方式修正我们的概念。即便如此,在某一特定的概念是必然的的主张和存在某一公认偶然概念的必然特征的主张之间仍然存在着不同。[43





The descriptive project of jurisprudence is to identify the essential or necessary features of our concept of law. No serious analytical philosopher ...believes that the prevailing concept of law is in any sense necessary: that no other concept is logically or otherwise possible. Nor do we believe that our concept of law can never be subject to revision. Quite the contrary. Technology may someday require us to revise our concept in any number of ways. Still, there is a difference between the claim that a particular concept is necessary and the claim that there are necessary features of an admittedly contingent concept.43





以哪种方式标签与本质是最为不同的,拉兹提到了既是偶然又是必然的法律的概念(或者用他稍微不同的术语,既是“地方性的”又是“普遍性的”)。根据拉兹的观点:(1)我们拥有一个法律的概念;(2)奠基于我们社会的自我理解之上;(3)我们的法律概念随时代而变化,随之引起制度上、实践上、态度上,甚至于哲学理论上的改变。[45





In what may well be more of a difference of label than of substance, Raz writes of a concept of law that seems to be both contingent and necessary (or, in his somewhat different terminology, both ‘parochial’ and ‘universal’44). According to Raz: (1) we have a concept of law; (2) based on our society’s self-understanding; and (3) our concept of law has changed over time, in response to changes in institutions, practices, attitudes, and even philosophical theories.45





让我们更加深入地观察一下拉兹分析中的这些概念。拉兹并不是柏拉图主义者,因此他并不相信法律的概念是某种永恒的柏拉图的理念(eternal Platonist Idea)——这对于所有人或对于所有时代都是一样的。[46]因此,觉得我们所研究的概念是“我们的概念”,是“一种特定文化的产物”——我们自己的是非常自然的。[47]因为算作“法律”(在我们的概念下)的独立于一个社会拥有的那一概念,很可能存在不能“分享”或“含有”我们的概念的早期文化或外国文化,但他们仍然有法律存在。[48





Let us look more closely at these notions within Raz’s analysis. Raz is not a Platonist, and therefore does not believe that the concept of law is some eternal Platonist Idea, which would be the same for all people or for all times.46 Therefore, it is natural to suspect that the concept we investigate is “our concept”, “the product of a specific culture” – our own.47 And since what counts as ‘law’ (under our concept) is independent of a society’s possessing that concept, there were likely earlier cultures or alien cultures that did not or do not ‘share’ or ‘have’ our concept, yet still had law.48




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