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拉兹论必然性(2)

添加时间:2006-06-07 16:15    浏览次数: 5070 次

因为法律的概念是随时代而变化的——并非我们“发现”的某种不变的理念——,拉兹将我们的法律概念视为某种独特的事物,一种在我们描述中可能正确或错误的事物,一种我们不能为我们的目的而再创造的事物(虽然他没有指出,因为法律的概念是流动的,我们的法律理论,即使是错误的理论,也能影响未来一代的法律的概念。[49])同样地,拉兹反对这样的观念,即我们(作为理论家)能够以其在未来深入研究中的成果[50],或者甚至其简易或精致[51]为基础来选择法律的概念;此外,它是一个早已存在的概念,早已是我们自我理解的一部分。拉兹再三提到,“独立于”试图解释它的法律哲学存在的“法律的概念”[52],以及法律的一般理论必须努力努力阐释的“法律的性质”。[53





While the concept of law has changed over time – not some unchanging Idea we are ‘discovering’ – Raz treats the/our concept of law as something unique, a matter about which we can be right or wrong in our descriptions, and which we cannot simply re-invent for our own purposes (though he does note that since concepts of law are in flux, our theories of law, even mistaken theories, could influence the concept of law future generations have49). Similarly, Raz rejects the notion that we (as theorists) can choose a concept of law based, say, on its fruitfulness in further research,50 or even accordingto its simplicity or elegance;51 rather, it is a concept already present, already part of our self-understanding. Raz refers repeatedly to “the concept of law” which “exists independently” of the legal philosophy which attempts to explain it,52 and “the nature of law” which general theories of law must strive to elucidate.53





当拉兹关于法律概念之观点这些被结合起来,其结果便是这样一个以两种不同方式成问题的立场。其一,根据拉兹的分析,概念或许适用于那些不拥有这个概念的社会。[54]拉兹强调,通过这一立场,没有什么根本的被含有或假设的:只有表达我们关于自我缓慢发展的理解的某种方式,就像概念在理解外国文化中德作用一样(这一理解需要概念的发展,它允许我们将那些实践的文化理解与我们对我们自己实践的理解联系起来)。[55]如拉兹所指出的,通过这一别处分析,我们似乎是没有麻烦的:例如,在这一概念被表达之前,我们就能谈论一直存在的社会的“生活标准”。[56





When these aspects of Raz’s view of the concept of law are combined, they result in a position which might seem problematic in two different ways. First, under Raz’s analysis, the concept may apply to societies who do not or did not have the concept.54 Raz emphasizes that nothing radical is implied or assumed by this position: only that some ways of articulating our understanding of ourselves develop slowly, as do concepts for understanding alien cultures (such understanding requiring the development of concepts which allow us to relate those cultures’ understanding of their practices to our understanding of our own practices).55 As Raz points out, we seem untroubled by this sort of analysis elsewhere: for example, we can talk about the ‘standard of living’ of a society which existed long before that concept had been articulated.56





第二个问题是某些读者很难摆脱的:即拉兹将对“必然性”提及与历史偶然性的谈论结合的方式。这可能是令人困惑的,前面提到过,假设这联系在道德哲学的论述中,在“必然性”和“事物必须如此的方式”或“在所有可能世界中事物必须如此的方式”之间。概念分析中的“必然性”——至少在拉兹的概念分析中——是比较“温和”的一种类型,它就是这样的。它只意味着对于讨论中的概念存在着内在联系(也就是说,作为一个法律体系就是主张权威状态),一个其自身是偶然的,并被约束于一个特定社会和时代的概念。





The second problem is one that some readers might find harder to shake off: the way Raz combines references to ‘necessity’ with talk of historical contingency. This can be confusing, given the connections, mentioned earlier, within normal philosophical discourse between ‘necessity’ and “the way things must be” or “the way things must be in all possible worlds”. The ‘necessity’ in conceptual analysis – at least in Raz’s conceptual analysis – is of a ‘softer’ kind, as it were. It means only that these are connections internal to the concept in question (e.g., to be a legal system is to claim authoritative status), a concept which is itself contingent and may be tied to a particular community and time-period.







43]科尔曼(1998a, p. 393 n. 59)。虽然我并不能完全确定科尔曼所谓技术要求对我们的概念进行修正意味着什么,但以自身为基础的偶然概念的观念是可以理解的。



在一本早期著作中,我通过追问,在“我们的法律概念的本质或必然的特征”这一短语中“必然的或本质的”起到什么作用,回应了本文中科尔曼的引文。比克斯(1999, p. 28 n. 59)。当注意到科尔曼的立场是与拉兹的如此相同时,我收回了前面的批判。我唯一要附加的是,能够从使得那些体系是“法律的”的“必然的或本质的特征”中识别出法律体系的特征,甚至是所有法律体系的特征仍然是重要的。参见拉兹(1998, p. 273 n. 38)。



44]参见,如拉兹(1996, pp. 17)。



45]参见拉兹(1996, 1998, 2004)。



46]对比一下西塞罗关于“自然法”的评论:



  真正的法律是与自然相符的正确理性;它是普遍适用的,是不变的、永恒的;……在罗马和在雅典,并不存在不同的法律,或者在现在或将来也不存在不同的法律,但是,一个永恒的、不可改变的法律是对所有国家和所有时代都有效的……



马库斯·图里乌斯·西塞罗(Marcus Tullius Cicero)《论共和国》Book III, xxii(西塞罗1928, p. 211)。我并不打算含有西塞罗的理想法的观点,或者一种为道德判断所有实在法的永恒标准,这和“法律”的现代概念分析是一样的。我引用西塞罗的原文只是为了举例说明一种不随时间而改变和独立于经验的观点。



47]拉兹(1996, p. 5)。



48]拉兹(1996, pp. 4, 5, 6)。



49]拉兹(1996, p. 7)。



50]参见,如拉兹(1994, p. 221)。



……得出结论说,一个人能够通过其理论的社会学的成果就能判断法律的概念分析是否成功是错误的。这样做是误解了这一点,并不像“群众”或“电子”那样的概念,“法律”是人们用来理解他们自己的概念。我们不能自由地挑出任何富有成果的概念。发展帮助我们理解人们如何理解自身的社会的理解力是法律理论的一项重要任务。



在那些根据采取相反的观点之中,可参见雷特(1998);里昂斯(1983, pp. 5759);塔玛纳哈(Tamanaha2000, pp. 283288)。在一本早期著作中(比克斯1999, pp. 928),我也赞同了一种相反的观点,但是在这个问题上,我比那本书所指的是更为不可知论的。



51]参见拉兹(2004)。



52]拉兹(1998, pp. 280281,附加重点)。



53]拉兹(1998, p. 2,附加重点),也可参见拉兹(2004)。



54]参见如拉兹(1998, p. 4)。(“法律的概念其自身是一种特定文化的产物,是一种不能对早期文化中的成员——实际上他们生活在一个法律体系之下——有约束力的概念”)。



55]拉兹(1998, pp. 45)。



56]拉兹(2004)。





 



以下㈧来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=61388





三、批判的回应





  除了前面讨论的关于概念分析之怀疑主义以外,对拉兹式主张——我们能够并且应该根据我们的法律概念谈论必然的真理——还存在几种不同的批判性回应。这一部分将要对那些已经产生的,或者将要产生的几种批判进行概述,并提出针对那些批判主义的回应。





Beyond the skepticism about conceptual analysis discussed earlier, there are a variety of possible critical responses to the Razian claim that we can and should speak of necessary truths regarding our concept of law. This Part will offer an overview of some of the criticisms which have been brought, or could have been brought, as well as the responses that might be made to those criticisms.





(一)唯名论与多元论[57



首先,存在一种较早出现的观念,认为并不存在单一的法律概念,或者至少没有优先于所有其他概念的概念。这一观念的最佳表述是布雷恩·塔玛纳哈的评论:





First, there is the view, hinted at earlier, that there is no single concept of law, or at least none that should be given priority over all the others. This view is well-presented by Brian Tamanaha’s comment:





设计一个科学的法律概念的想法是以法律构成了一个基本范畴的误导的信念为基础的。恰恰相反,法律完全是一种文化构造,缺乏任何的普遍性性质。法律就是我们贴上法律标签的任何东西(我们称之为法律的就是法律)。[58





The project to devise a scientific concept of law was based upon the misguided belief that law comprises a fundamental category. To the contrary, law is thoroughly a cultural construct, lacking any universal nature. Law is whatever we attach the label law to.58





这可能被看作是唯名论对于概念理论的攻击:并不存在“法律”的范畴(性质或别的),“法律”是我们想让它称为法律的任何东西,因此,想要知道某种我们建构的(并且只要我们想,就可以以另一种方式建构)东西的“性质”或“必要的性质”,这充其量是一种奇怪的实践。也许法哲学只能是——用一个评论者的话说——“一种辞典编篡与本地历史的结合,或者……是所有辞典编纂与所有本地历史的链结的结合”。[59





This can be seen to be a nominalist attack on conceptual theory: there is no category (natural or otherwise) ‘law’, ‘law’ is whatever we want it to be, so it is a strange exercise at best to wonder about the ‘nature’ or ‘essential nature’ of something we have constructed (and could construct a different way if we so choose). Perhaps jurisprudence can only be, in a phrase used by one commentator, “a conjunction of lexicography with local history, or ...a juxtaposition of all lexicographies conjoined with all local histories”.59





对于这种唯名论[61](虽然比拉兹可能提出的更为温和或最小化的)的一项回应[60]是,一个人不需要假定任何类型的形而上学归类来证明概念的理论化。然而,在我们的“法律”范畴中项目的包含与排除的武断,如果存在某些令人感兴趣的能被称为关于这一范畴的所有(或许是唯一)的项目,这一理论化的过程就是有价值的。[62](一个人也可能从不同的方向得到这个问题,如弗里德瑞克·绍尔(Frederick Schauer)所作的,并提出了这一建议,即存在单一的概念——“法律”,但是没有什么令人感兴趣的能被称为它的东西。[63])






One response60 to this sort of nominalism61 (though one more modest or minimalist than Raz would likely offer) is that one need not posit any sort of metaphysical grouping to justify theorizing about concepts. However arbitrary the inclusion or exclusion of items in our category ‘law’, if there is something interesting that can be said about all (and perhaps only) the items in that category, the process of theorizing will have value.62 (One could also come at the question from the other direction, as Frederick Schauer did, and offer the suggestion that maybe there is a single concept, ‘law’, but nothing interesting can be said about it.63)





一个人可能颠倒前面的观点:并非应该存在或多或少任意的范畴,对此可能存在也可能不存在令人感兴趣的言说的某种东西,毋宁说我们应该“建构”或“选择”会有最佳实践结果的范畴。[64]弗里德瑞克·绍尔富有争议地将这一立场与H. L. A.哈特和朗·富勒(Lon Fuller)联系起来:“富勒和哈特都同样地拥有这样的信念,即提出一项法律性质的叙述并不是象规范指引的建构一样的发现的事物,法律性质的最佳表述是一种最有可能服务于深层规范性目的的”。[65





One can invert the prior point: not that there should be more-or-less arbitrary categories, about which there may or may not be something interesting to say, but rather that we should ‘build’ or ‘select’ the categories which will have the best practical consequences.64 Frederick Schauer, controversially, associates that position with both H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller: “Both Fuller and Hart appear equally committed to the belief that giving an account of the nature of law is not so much a matter of discovery as one of normatively-guided construction, with the best account of the nature of law being the one most likely to serve deeper normative goals”.65





在最近的文章中,[66]塔玛纳哈澄清了他的原初立场,并在前半部分进行了讨论,这一澄清提供了一种明显不同的可能的评论。他主张,他的较早的评论不应该被理解为对概念理论的攻击,毋宁说是对概念理论的某一特定类型的攻击。塔玛纳哈没有从存在一种单一的“法律”的概念或“‘法律’的核心概念”(如国内法)的立场——就此而言,其他类型的法律(如国际法、习惯法)是不重要的、派生的,或者不完善的例证——出发,他主张存在“大量的法律的具体表现形式,其中每一个都有自己的特征”,并且任何一个都不能优先于其余的。[68]塔玛纳哈主张,在一个人的法律理论化过程中,并没有好的理由赋予国内法对于国际法的优先地位。[68]此外,可以指出,对于国内法核心的理论化很可能已经达到了能够达到的所有重要理解,通过一种不同的金鹿,将焦点集中于法律的不同形式(或者法律的不同观点)很可能会产生新的理解。[69





Tamanaha has, in a recent article,66 clarified his original position, discussed in the prior sub-section, and the clarification offers a distinctly different possible critique. He argues that his earlier comments should not be read as an attack on conceptual theory as such, but rather as an attack on a particular kind of conceptual theory. Instead of starting from the position that there is a single concept of ‘law’ or a ‘core concept of ‘law’ ” (e.g., state law), to which other kinds of law (e.g., international law, customary law) are peripheral, derivative, or defective instantiations, Tamanaha argues for there being “a multitude of specific manifestations of law, each of which has its own characteristic features” and none of which would have any priority over the rest.67 Tamanaha argues that there is no good reason for giving state law priority over, say, international law in one’s theorizing about law.68 Alternatively, it could be pointed out that theorizing with state law at the core has likely already achieved all the important insights which it can, and that a different approach, centering on a different form of law (or a different view of law) would likely produce new insights.69





无论塔玛纳哈的主张有什么样的价值,人们可能会认为,他并没有触及拉兹观点的核心。如果存在一种“(国内)法”的概念,那么也存在另一个或更为宽泛的包含或与“(国内)法”重叠的概念的事实并不是拉兹的法律理论需要否认的。





Whatever the merits of Tamanaha’s claim, one might argue that it does not go to the core of Raz’s views. If there is one concept of ‘(state) law’, the fact that there is also another or broader concept that includes or overlaps that of ‘(state) law’ is not something the Razian legal theorist need deny.







57]我的意思并不是说要诉诸于“法律多元主义”的社会学/人类学的观念,以此观念看,下面的讨论至多是一种离题的关联。关于社会科学观念,参见如塔玛纳哈(1993)。



58]塔玛纳哈(1997, p. 128,脚注省略)。



59]菲尼斯(Finnis1980, p. 4)。当然,菲尼斯的立场是,法哲学并不仅仅是这样一个结合。参见id. at pp. 318



60]在比克斯(2000, pp. 230234)中它是一个详细的回应。



61]有个学者已经将“唯名论”界定为“这样一种观点,事物是由名称术语命名的,除这一事实外别无所有”。布莱克伯恩(Blackburn1994, p. 264)。



62]参见如比克斯(2000, p. 231)。



我们也应该将关于概念和概念分析的一般怀疑主义与批判的美国和斯堪的纳维亚法律现实主义者区分开,后者反对法官和法律注释者将法律的概念引入其“性质”为他们所研究的客体之中,并用来证明特定的法律的结论。参见如科恩(Cohen1935);罗斯(Ross1959, pp. 178183)。



63]绍尔写道:



并不是每一个存在于世界之上的种类都是哲学上作为一种种类来关注的。“伦敦的居民”、“以字母Q开头的食物”,以及“职业的篮球运动员”这些种类都是“实在的”,即使它们并不是自然的种类,并不是本体论上居首的,也不是重要的哲学关注的种类。同样,法律可能作为个人的、制度的和实践的一种类似非本体论(nonontologically)上居首之集合存在,是无可争议的世界的一部分,但是却不含有法律的哲学家经常假设的哲学上关注的核心(Schauer 1994, p. 508)。



64]这不能与有着最佳理论上的重要性(对于研究的重要性)的范畴——一种与布雷恩·雷特相联系的观点——相混淆。



65]绍尔(1994, p. 290);哈特(1994, pp. 207212)(提出了在两种“法律的竞争性概念”(“rival concepts of law”)之间的区别,我们应该选择比较宽泛的一个,因为它能帮助我们与恶法相对抗)。



66]塔玛纳哈(2000)。



67]塔玛纳哈(2000, p. 284



68[塔玛纳哈(2000, p. 284)。



69]塔玛纳哈(2000, pp. 284285)。塔玛纳哈补充说,一个国内法居于首要地位的法律理论并不能适应于当前的实践,当前市民们经常受到法律的复合形式的支配(从他们的国家到欧盟到不同的国际法院)。Id.





 



以下㈨来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=64773





(二)关于一般法理学之概说的怀疑



一种不同的批判是由罗纳德·德沃金的著作提出的,虽然更为含蓄而不是更为明确。德沃金提出了一种对于法律和法律理论的诠释性进路,其中他坚信,引人关注的工作是在特定法律体系的诠释层级上,而不是法律的一般理论的层级上。[70





A different criticism is offered, albeit more implicitly than expressly, in Ronald Dworkin’s work. Dworkin offers an interpretive approach to law and legal theory, within which he asserts that the interesting work will be at the level of interpretations of particular legal systems, rather than at the level of general theories of law.70





德沃金的立场并不是说关于法律的一般化理论是不可能的或不融贯的,而是说它们是没有成效的:在人们谈及所有法律体系时,并不存在什么非常引人关注的,但是当人们谈及特定法律体系时,则存在诸多有价值的东西。[71](这也是很重要的,即德沃金认为,关于法律更为一般的论述是与在日常法律实践中做出的非常具体的主张连接在一起的。众所周知,他写道,“没有固定的界限将法理学与司法或其他法律实践分割开来”。[72])





Dworkin’s position is not so much that theories generally about law are impossible or incoherent, but rather that they are not productive: that there is nothing terribly interesting that one can say about all legal systems, but that there are many things of value one can say about particular legal systems.71 (It may also be significant that Dworkin sees more general statements about law being tied to quite specific claims made within daily legal practice. He famously states that “no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice”.72)





人们可能会以德沃金对挑战其奠基于普遍的不确定性或普遍的不可通约性(不兼容性)之上的正确答案理论(right-answer theory)的人的回应的同样方式来回应他。他的回应是,论证不能,或者说不能轻易地在普遍层级上做出,而是必须零碎地做出。德沃金的论证是为了某一特定案件,人们为了得到一个(一些)正确答案要建构论证,批判者要表明的是,对于这一问题并不存在正确的答案,或者在可能答案中的价值是不可通约的。[73]同种回应可以对德沃金之法律理论的恰当范围的观点提出:一旦一个理论主旨是关于一般的法律(的概念)的令人关注的事物,那么对于批判者表明这一理论在某种方式上不完善就是恰当的。[74





One might respond to Dworkin the same way he has responded to challenges to his right-answer theory based on global indeterminacy or global incommensurability (incomparability). His response has been that arguments cannot, or cannot easily, be made on a global level, but must be made piecemeal. Dworkin’s argument is that for a particular case, one puts up an argument for there being a (certain) right answer, and it is up to the critic to show that for this question there is no right answer, or that the values factored into a possible answer are incommensurable.73 The same sort of response could be offered to Dworkin’s view on the proper scope of legal theory: once a theory purports to say something interesting about (the concept of) law generally, it will then be proper for critics to show that this theory is faulty in some way.74





对于这一评论,德沃金自己的著作至多是提供了令人怀疑的支持。虽然他确实写到特定法律体系的诠释,以及在特定法律体系中的学说领域,但是他同时又将主张适用于所有的法律体系:[75]最为重要的是,这种所有的法律体系——实际上是所有的社会制度——是(应该是)通过建构诠释来理解的。[76]此外,当他在讨论美国的法律体系过程中提出了一种理论时,[77]他从未表明对于其他的、明显不同的法律体系(例如英国的、法国的、伊朗的或西藏Tibet的),一种明显不同的理论是适合的。





Dworkin’s own work is, at best, doubtful support for this critique. While it is true that he writes of the interpretation of particular legal systems, and doctrinal areas within particular legal systems, he simultaneously makes claims that apply to all legal systems:75 most importantly, that all legal systems – indeed, all social institutions – are (should be) understood through constructive interpretation.76 Also, while he offers one theory in discussions of the legal systemof the United States,77 he never indicates that a distinctly different theory would be appropriate for some other, distinctly different legal system (e.g., that of England, France, Iran, or Tibet).







70]参见,如德沃金(1986, pp. 102103; 1987, p. 16)。



71]德沃金(1986, pp. 102103; 1987, p. 16)。



72]德沃金(1987, p. 14)。



73]参见,如德沃金(1986, pp. 266275; 1991, pp. 8990)。



74Cf. Raz (1998, p. 282)



75Cf. (Raz 1998, p. 282):“这本书(《法律帝国》)像上面篇章(Laws Empire, at pp. 102103)的一样给人一种谦逊的假象。从其开始到最后的章节,一次又一次,它声称自己提供了——并不胜任的——一种在所有它的帝国领域内的法律的叙述”。



76]参见德沃金(1986, pp. 4953)。德沃金将“建构诠释”界定为“为了理解它被归入的形式或样式的最为典型的例子,对于某一客体或实践强加入目的”。



77]在某种情况下,他对英格兰(和威尔士)的法律进行了稍转即逝的提及,但是他并为对英国法提出一种不同的理论。







以下㈩来源:http://gangou.fyfz.cn/blog/gangou/index.aspx?blogid=67055





(三)还需要做出选择(“规范的法理学”)



当拉兹(以及科尔曼和其他人)努力为一种与古典的柏拉图主义毫无关联的概念法理学辩护时,这一进路带有不负担许多人不大可能发现的形而上学的优点(至少在适用于社会实践和制度的地方)。另一方面,柏拉图主义也有相关的优点,即它解释了为什么对法律的概念研究有一个单一的(正确的)答案。当我们将“法律的概念”转化为“我们的法律的概念”时,在证明存在惟一的这样的概念上便需要我们做出更多的工作。





When Raz (and Coleman and others) try to defend a conceptual jurisprudence unconnected with classical Platonism, this approach has the advantage of not being burdened with a metaphysics many people find unlikely (at least where applied to social practices and institutions). On the other hand, Platonism has the relative advantage of explaining why it is that there is a single (correct) answer to conceptual inquiries about law. When we move from “the concept of law” to “our concept of law”, there is more work to be done in justifying the assumption or conclusion that there is only one such concept.





斯蒂芬·皮雷(Stephen Perry)的许多著作都以类似于用来反对拉兹的批判的观点作为基础:存在着不止一个关于法律性质的站得住脚的理论(以关于法律目的的不同的站得住脚的理论为基础),并且对它们的选择必须以道德或政治为基础。[78]布雷恩·雷特已经部分地以皮雷的著作为基础,提出了一个相同的论证:存在着诸多不同的法律的概念,它们都可以平等合法的被称为“我们的概念”;假设这是事实,在什么基础上拉兹(或其他人)能主张被选出的概念是正确的一个呢?[79]雷特继续主张,选择“较后的研究规划的最富有成果的理解”(也就是说,给我们提供了关于世界如何运作的最好的表述的那个)的法律的概念。[80





Much of Stephen Perry’s work is grounded on a claim similar to the critique that could be raised against Raz: that there is more than one tenable theory about the nature of law (grounded on different tenable theories about the purpose of law), and the choice among them must be made on moral or political grounds.78 Brian Leiter has offered a similar argument, grounded in part on Perry’s work: that there are a number of different concepts of law, more than one of which could equally legitimately be claimed to be “our concept”; given that fact, on what grounds can Raz (or anyone else) argue that the concept he has picked out is the right one?79 Leiter goes on to advocate choosing the concept of law “that figures in the most fruitful a posteriori research programs (i.e., the ones that give us the best going account of how the world works)”.80





关于在站得住脚的法律理论中(或者说在以这些可供选择的理论为基础的站得住脚的法律规划中)是否确实存在需要做出的选择,以及关于这一选择是否必然是规范的,或者以概念的或道德中立的元理论为基础能被证立的,在这些文献中存在着基本的论证。[81]拉兹所提及的“法律的概念”,甚至“在一个特定时刻,概念出现于某一文化内部”[82]的方式,看起来是假设仅仅存在着一个法律的概念(或者,也许是更为精确地说,在当代对我们来说仅仅有一个法律的概念),但是,观点自然是不能自我证明的。





There is substantial argument in the literature about whether there are in fact choices that need to be made among tenable theories of law (or among the tenable purposes of law that ground these alternative theories), and about whether such choices are necessarily normative, or can be justified on conceptual or morally neutral metatheoretical grounds.81 Raz’s references to ‘the concept of law’, and even to the way ‘concepts emerge within a culture at a particular juncture’,82 seem to assume that there is only one concept of law (or, perhaps more precisely, only one concept of law for us in the present era), but the view is, of course, not self-evident.





对于拉兹所谓在法理学中“必然性”的作用的观点,一种更为详尽的表述和辩护要求参与到这样的辩论之中,即是否存在一种以上的站得住脚的法律概念,以及如果存在一种以上,对于在站得住脚的概念中进行选择,(并不依赖于道德评价)概念分析的元理论资源是否是充足的。





A fuller articulation and defense of Raz’s ideas of the role of ‘necessity’ in jurisprudence will require participating in the debate about whether there can ever be more than one tenable concept of law, and whether, if there is more than one, the meta-theoretical resources of conceptual analysis are sufficient (without recourse to moral evaluation) to choose among the tenable concepts.





结论





法律理论家已经开始——今天的人们或许会认为有点迟来了——严肃地揭示他们所使用的方法论和他们提出的主张的性质问题。特别是在约瑟夫·拉兹最近的著作中,他已经介入这一“元论述”(meta-discussion)之中,并提出了一些在不断发展的文献中的最富有洞察力,又最富于争议的观点。[83]两个关键的相互联系的问题是,概念分析是否是适宜的,以及在法理学中人们是否能表达“必然的”真理。对于这两个问题,拉兹的回答都是肯定的。然而,理解到拉兹的“必然性”观念显然不同于哲学中“必然性”是关键性的:明确区别于逻辑上的必然性,也明确区别于在柏拉图哲学语境和“自然类型”理论中讨论的必然性类型。它也许是更为维特根斯坦式(或黑格尔式)的观念,是与一个社会和一个时代或一种“生活方式”的必然性关系。然而,这一必然性观点需要更为深入的阐释,它并不能对法理学中的概念分析之最近一般性批判自动免疫,它也不能对那些挑战提出任何简单的回答。尽管如此,对于法理学中“必然性”主张的意义没有清晰的理解,我们就不能为概念分析进行辩护。我们至少应该对于我们的社会含有复合的和相互冲突的法律概念的可能性保持开放的态度;也许,就像W.B.加利(W. B. Gallie)分析“艺术”和“民主”概念所主张的,我们的“法律”概念实际上是竞争性的(以一种复杂示例或一套示例的不同的站得住脚的解释为基础)。[84





Legal theorists have come, rather late in the day one might think, to explore seriously the methodology they use and the nature of the claims they offer. Joseph Raz, especially in his most recent work, has entered this ‘meta-discussion’, and offered some of the most insightful and provocative ideas in the growing literature.83 Two key – and related – questions are whether conceptual analysis is appropriate and whether one can speak of ‘necessary’ truths in jurisprudence. Raz’s answer to both questions is “yes”. However, it is key to understanding this claim that Raz’s idea of ‘necessity’ is distinctly different from what one finds elsewhere in philosophy: sharply different from logical necessity, and almost as distant from the type of necessity discussed in the context of Platonic philosophy and ‘natural kinds’ theories. It is perhaps a more Wittgensteinian(or Hegelian) notion, a necessity relative to a society and a time or a ‘way of life’. However, this view of necessity requires further elaboration, and it carries no automatic immunity to the recent general criticisms of conceptual analysis in jurisprudence, nor does it offer any easy answers to those challenges. Nonetheless, without a clear understanding of what is meant by claims of ‘necessity’ in jurisprudence, we cannot begin the process of defending conceptual analysis. And we should at least be open to the possibility that our society contains multiple and conflicting concepts of law; perhaps, as W. B. Gallie suggested for the concepts of ‘art’ and ‘democracy’, our concept of ‘law’ is essentially contested (grounded in different tenable interpretations of a complex paradigm or set of paradigms).84







[78]参见:如皮雷(19951996)。



79]雷特(1998, pp. 545547)。与皮雷和雷特的主张相似,但以有些不同的分析作为基础的,参见露西(Lucy1999, pp. 7079);墨菲(Murphy2001.



80]雷特(1998, p. 547)。对比拉兹对于理论建构之功能驱动(functionally-driven)进路的驳斥,前注50.



81]对于皮雷的回应,主张在选择的概念分析中有充足的资源,参见科尔曼(2001, pp. 197210)。



82]拉兹(1996, p. 4)。



83]其他对于这一“元论述”有重要贡献的包括朱尔斯·科尔曼(1998a, b, 2001, 2002)、朱丽·迪克森(2001)、斯蒂芬·皮雷(19951996)、布雷恩·雷特(19982002)和威廉姆·露西(1999)。





ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS





I am grateful to Jules L. Coleman, David Luban, Linda R. Meyer, Lukas H. Meyer, Thomas H.Morawetz, Dennis M. Patterson, Stanley L. Paulson, Joseph Raz, Brian Z. Tamanaha, and an anonymous reader, for their comments and suggestions.





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作者单位:明尼苏达大学法学院



译者单位:河南师范大学法学院


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